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John Mortimer of Manumbar and the 
1861 Native Police Inquiry in Queensland 
by Malcolm D. Prentis 
ParUamentary committees of inquiry into 'Aboriginal problems" were 
common in the Australian colonies during and even after the frontier 
era. The opening of the Queensland pastoral frontier between the 
1840s and 1860s produced a whole series of inquiries. Before 
separation, there were inquiries in 1845, 1846, 1857 and 1858. After 
separation, there were further inquiries in 1860 and 1861. Of these 
six inquiries, the 1857 inquiry has been frequently used in accounts 
of colonial race relations, while the 1858 inquiry related to the famous 
Hornet Bank massacre. 
The 1861 inquiry focused on the Native Police and, possibly for 
that reason, has not until recently been so prominent in the pubUshed 
literature, aUhough it has featured prominently in several unpubUshed 
theses. Winifred Cowin used the report in a very perceptive account 
of the Native Police in her pioneering and under-rated thesis, but could 
have strengthened her own case wdth more knowledge of the members 
of the Select Committee.' John Taylor makes use of the report as a 
"distiUation of the squatting experience of the previous 20 years" and 
as a formative document in Aboriginal policy for 30 years to come, 
while theses by Walker and N. Taylor also refer to the inquiry's report, 
but mainly for factual information on their specialized topics.^  There 
is a brief reference to the inquiry in a study of one of the witnesses, 
Captain Coley.' Cryle's study of newspapers in early Queensland 
looks at the part the press played in forcing an inquiry, and was the 
first one to take very much notice of the role of John Mortimer in 
this.* Bill Rosser makes extensive use of the inquiry, even quoting 
John Mortimer's evidence at length. However, Rosser's main focus 
is on another incident.' Henry Reynolds quotes from the evidence 
to explain the modus operandi of the Force.* 
As we shall see, Mortimer's intervention helped to bring to a head, 
pressure on the government and parliament to inquire into Aboriginal 
questions. The parliament decided on a Select Committee in April 
1861 and elected the committee on 1 May. The committee met from 
3 May to 12 July, examined 28 witnesses, and reported to the 
Malcolm Prentis, Senior Lecturer in History at AustraUan CathoUc University (N.S.W), 
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Legislative Assembly on 17 July. The terms of reference were to 
investigate and report on: 
1. the condition and organisation of the Native Police force; 
2. charges of unnecessary cruelty by the officers in dealing with 
the natives; 
3. the prospect of civiUsing, or in any way improving, the condition 
of the Aboriginal population.^ 
Four incidents were specifically investigated under term of reference 
number two, one of them the Manumbar incident vigorously reported 
by John Mortimer. 
Before returning to the setting up of the Inquiry, it is necessary 
to examine the history of John Mortimer, especially at Manumbar, 
in the context of frontier life and race relations in the Wide Bay-
Burnett region, and the activities of the Native PoUce in that region 
which led up to the events from 10 to 12 February 1861. These events 
led to Mortimer's intervention. 
THE MORTIMERS AND MANUMBAR 
John Mortimer was born in rural Aberdeenshire, Scotland in 1810, 
son of a tenant-farmer and craftsman. His family background shaped 
an almost stereotypical Scot — a pious Calviiust who valued education 
and hard work greatly, was reserved, dour and stubborn, and was an 
inveterate migrant. Members of the family emigrated in the nineteenth 
century to the U.S.A., Canada, South Africa, Australia and New 
Zealand. John Mortimer emigrated first to the U.S.A. In 1842 he was 
in Opelousas, Louisiana. By 1848, he was an AustraUan squatter. His 
younger brother Alec joined him ten years later via South Africa.* 
In 1865, two of his widowed sister's sons came out from Scotland, 
one of whom was John Mathew, who became a minister and 
anthropologist of note and left some valuable information about his 
uncle and Manumbar station. 
John Mortimer was a backwoodsman among squatters. He lived 
on the property and worked hard and long. His plain manner and 
appearance sometimes led to this being mistaken for one of his men. 
His honesty was legendary, as was his frugality. He was a skilled 
carpenter and joiner, building most of the station buUdings himself. 
He and his wife kept a strict Sabbath on the station and ran a Sabbath 
School for both black and white employees and their children. He 
had a well-stocked library which he liked to see used. His stubborn 
adherence to principle is illustrated by a dispute he had with a minister 
in Louisiana who would not admit him to communion "unless he 
was able to state that he was a total abstainer". Though the 
consequences were painful to a pious Presbyterian, Mortimer refused. 
He knew his doctrine better than the minister. He rigidly observed 
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the Sabbath and gave his employees the day off, but did not force 
them to observe the day as he did.' Mortimer's nephew no doubt 
had him in mind when he wrote in a poem that the squatter had won 
his weaUh "By hardship, thrift, and industry".'" 
John Mortimer and silent partner Andrew Anderson took up the 
16,000 acre Manumbar run in 1848, the year J.C. BidwiU was 
appointed as first Commissioner for Crown Lands in the Wide Bay 
district, and the year before the arrival of Moreton Bay's first 
immigrant ship, the Fortitude. Manumbar was — and stUl is — remote, 
in scrubby and rugged country just west of the range dividing the 
Mary and Burnett watersheds and just north of the range dividing 
the basins of the Brisbane and Burnett. In 1854, Mortimer and 
Anderson took up an adjacent 16,000 acre block, Gallangowan. In 
1857, two further adjoining blocks of 16,000 acres each, Toomcul and 
Gobongo, were leased by John Mortimer alone, and GaUangowan was 
transferred to John Mortimer and his brother Alexander. IWo years 
later, the leases on Manumbar, Toomcul and Gobongo, were 
transferred to John and Alexander Mortimer. Then from 1864 to 1869, 
Toomcul and Manumbar were transferred to Andrew Anderson and 
from 1864 to 1868, Gobongo and Gallangowan were transferred to 
Alexander Mortimer. In 1868 and 1869, aU four leases were transferred 
back to John Mortimer alone. Gobongo North, also of 16,000 acres, 
was leased by John Mortimer in 1874. Between 1874 and 1885, the 
size of each of the five runs was adjusted a few times." In 1875, 
Mortimer sold a half share of the property to a relative, J. Henderson, 
who became manager. Under the Crown Lands Act of 1884, the five 
runs were consolidated into one, and divided into "resumed" and 
"leased" halves, except for a number of pre-emptive purchases and 
reserves.'^ 
In 1858 the Mortimers ran 4000 sheep on each of the four runs. 
They were very slow to get out of sheep and in 1865 still had 16,(XX) 
sheep and only 20(X) cattle.'^ After a serious outbreak of sheep 
catarrh, the Board of Sheep Directors bought the sheep at 4d and 
6d per head and boiled them down, at a loss to the sheep fund of 
£1876. Mortimer then very belatedly turned to cattle, long after all 
his neighbours.''' 
In the 1880s, Manumbar was beseiged by plagues of brumbies, 
kangaroos and the threat of small-holders. Mortimer was reluctant 
to cooperate with the authorities in exterminating kangaroos.'^ The 
station had some fine horses in this period and perhaps for breeding 
reasons, Mortimer did not help the brumby-catchers. He had told an 
Aboriginal stockman. Jack Simpson, not to give away the brumbies' 
whereabouts. Later, in the presence of the horse-catchers, he asked 
Jack Simpson about them. Jack said "Oh, some dead, some dying, 
and some wanting to die".'* By this time, many of his neighbours 
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would have regarded Mortimer as dangerously eccentric. But he was 
never afraid to stand up for his beliefs against the world, good 
Calvanist that he was. Finally, after looking for a buyer for nearly 
ten years, John Mortimer sold the lease on Manumbar to Alonzo 
Sparkes and Lauchlan McKinnon, Brisbane butchers, in July 1887.'^ 
He died within twelve months. 
Manumbar was located near the western borders of the Kabi-
speaking people, who occupied the coast between Bribie and Fraser 
Islands and as far inland as Barambah, where Kabi and Wakka folk 
were neighbours. The three "clans" or local groups closest to 
Manumbar were the Kaiabora south of Mt Widgee, the Baiyambora 
of the upper Yabba Creek and the Booyoora, centred between 
Manumbar and Gobongo.'^ The last two were the groups with whom 
John Mortimer was to have most to do. 
THE KABI AND WAKKA ABORIGINES 
There were two local factors which were to complicate and worsen 
race relations in the Wide Bay and Burnett area of south-east 
Queensland, including Manumbar. One was Araucaria bidwilli, the 
bunya tree, to be found in the Bunya and Blackall Ranges and 
elsewhere. Every January and February, large numbers of "foreign 
blacks" used to be welcomed by the Kabi and Wakka to feast on bunya 
nuts. They would come from as far as 200 miles (320 km) away, from 
the Richmond, Dawson and Maclntyre Rivers." These trees were 
abundant around Manumbar. Not unnaturally, the squatters and other 
white settlers from the 1840s to the 1860s grew very apprehensive at 
bunya time. The whites beUeved that the tribes were conspiring against 
them, that the blacks were especially troublesome at this time, and 
even that they greatly hungered for human flesh in the bunya 
season.^" There was certainly evidence for an increase in stock-
killing, though John Mortimer was to tell the Select Committee that 
he had not had more trouble at that time of year.^' Such was the 
settlers' fear (one might even say paranoia) at bunya time, that the 
Native Police were specially mobilized and engaged in more 
"dispersals" than usual. Tension was always high. The second local 
factor was the proximity of the pastoral areas of Wide Bay to large 
areas of unoccupied coastal lands and areas of rugged mountainous 
land. Both of these types of locations were seen by nervous settlers 
as sanctuaries for aggressive Aborigines. As J.C. Taylor points out, 
"salt-water blacks" from Fraser Island and the coast began to raid 
the stations inland in the late 1850s and early 1860s, when their iiUand 
neighbours were beginning to settle on the stations.^^ The common 
thread through these two local factors is the feeling of threat 
engendered in the white intruders by the coming of unfamiUar blacks, 
especially in large groups. Partly as a result of these factors, racial 
conflict was particularly prolonged in the Wide Bay-Burnett region. 
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Maryborough, "every acre of land in these districts was won from 
the aborigines by blood-shed and warfare".^' 
It has been estimated that 55 Europeans were killed by Aborigines 
in the Wide Bay and Burnett region between 1841 and 1855 by the 
Wakka and Kabi, whose territory substantially covered the region. 
In revenge, perhaps ten times as many Aborigines were killed by 
Whites.^ Within the region, Gin Gin near Bundaberg and Widgee 
near Gympie had particular reputations for racial violence, though 
not as famous as Hornet Bank on the Dawson. The historian of the 
Hornet Bank massacre of 1857 believes that Wakka tribesmen were 
among the attackers.^' Hornet Bank had an enormous effect on the 
fear and aggression of settlers throughout Wide Bay and the Burnett 
as well as elsewhere. The settlers were strongly determined to "break" 
the tribes once and for all. The Kabi and Wakka were essentially 
broken by 1859, and the instrument of their fate was the Native 
Police.^* 
THE ABORIGINES AND NATIVE POLICE 
As early as 1850 and 1851 Kabi and Wakka people were starting 
to work on pastoral stations in the Wide Bay-Burnett area.^' This 
was to be an established form of economic symbiosis for a long time, 
with Aborigines receiving some food and clothing, other European 
goods and, often, protection against the Native Police. They worked 
as shepherds, stockmen and general station hands and often their 
extended families camped on the stations. They were thus able to 
maintain territorial and religious links. However, the squatters 
generally got the better of the bargain and exploited the cheap black 
labour available.^* Nevertheless, it is important to realise that 
situations varied. On the one hand. Walker can justifiably write: 
Settlers came into the Maryborough District. . . with a conceptual 
framework largely incompatible with the implementation of a policy 
of conciliation.^' 
On the other hand, there were some squatters who genuinely 
attempted conciliation and John Mortimer was one of them. Others 
giving evidence to the 1861 inquiry had also done so. Tom Petrie and 
Robert Christison, Scots like Mortimer, also protected "their" blacks 
against the "indiscriminate attentions" of the Native Police.^" 
When Mortimer first arrived in 1848, he was based on the Toomcul 
block. While there he had had no problems with the Aborigines. It 
was only after moving to Manumbar itself that he had had sheep 
stolen; sometimes the thieves had skinned the sheep in the presence 
of the shepherd. There had also been nocturnal raids, huts had been 
robbed and a woman molested, though non-one had been killed. 
Understandably, it had been difficult to get shepherds to stay. He had 
471 
asked for police assistance, but they had generally ignored his requests. 
At least from 1852, John Mortimer had employed Aboriginal 
shepherds on Manumbar and the out-stations.'' Some were locals 
and some were from the Yabbar area nearby. However, before 1861, 
it appears that there was no permanent camp of "station blacks" 
on Manumbar. The Baiyambora appear to have moved from the Yabba 
area to camp in the home paddock of Manumbar at about this 
time.'^ The move may, in fact, have been the direct consequence of 
the incidents of 1861 related below. In any case, some clan members 
had moved back and forth from Yabba to Manumbar before this. 
The Mortimers provided for the material wants of their station 
blacks, food, clothing and protection, and also for their spiritual well-
being by providing a Sunday school and a strict Sabbath. The station 
blacks seemed to have a fair degree of freedom to move around as 
well as off and on the station. John Mortimer was very definite that 
protection of "his" blacks was a significant responsibility. He told 
them always to identify themselves as "Mr Mortimer's men" if in 
danger of being mistaken for foreign or dangerous blacks." While 
the station was intact and John Mortimer ran it, the "station blacks" 
could expect to live in a way which, while adapting to station life and 
incorporating European ways and material things, managed to aUow 
them to continue "the fundamentals of their social behaviour and 
beliefs ".'" 
It was the Native Mounted Police who were to threaten the 
protection offered by John Mortimer to "his" Kabi. Even though 
there is no definitive complete history of the Force in Queensland, 
it is well enough documented not to require a detailed account 
here." From the early 1850s to the late 1860s, the Native Police were 
active in the Wide Bay and Burnett. Their headquarters in the 1850s 
had been at Yabba, not far from Manumbar, though by 1860 they 
had moved to Tinana near Maryborough. In 1869, just before they 
finally left Wide Bay, the headquarters were near Gympie.'* 
The standard policies of the Native Police were "dispersal" of large 
gatherings of Aborigines, and punishment. At least by 1860, when 
primary resistance by the kabi had been broken, John Mortimer 
believed the force should act in a preventative fashion by patrolling 
regularly instead of retaUating when it was too late. Violent retaliation 
would not have been necessary if visits had been more frequent, he 
believed." As we have seen, areas like Manumbar received visits 
from "foreign blacks" every January and February for the bunya 
feasts. Most squatters became rather jumpy at that time of year and 
the Native Police were put on full alert. Until February 1861, however, 
Manumbar had received no visit from the force for eighteen months. 
This tends to confirm the impression given by the 1861 evidence from 
the officers that the force worked by "crisis management" rather than 
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planned, regular patrolling, regulations to the contrary 
notwithstanding.'* 
The troopers were recruited for five years from outside the region 
as a matter of policy. It is likely that the Wide Bay troopers of 1860-61 
came mainly from the Gumbainggar and Bandjalang of the north 
coast of New South Wales. Thirty members of these two tribes were 
recruited in 1857, a high proportion of the Queensland force. Some 
of them, therefore, may have known something about the area because 
some Bandjalang-speakers used to visU it for the bunya feasts.'' 
Dressed in green with red trouser-stripes and a smart white peaked 
cap or, while in action, undressed, the troopers preceded the white 
officers or sergeants into action. Usually operating in detachments 
of six to eight, they were feared and hated by the local Aborigines. 
The quality of the officers was very variable. One long-serving officer, 
Lt Frederick Wheeler, gave his opinion of the Aborigines to the 1861 
inquiry: "I don't think they can understand anything else except 
shooting them." He also confessed, "I know so little of the blacks. 
They run before me. I never see them!'"*" Even when the officers 
could control the troopers, regulations were breached — so much more 
was this the case when they could not control them. In the aftermath 
of Hornet Bank and at bunya time this control was on a hair-trigger. 
EVENTS AROUND NAMUMBAR IN 1861 
In February 1861, the customary tension developed in Wide Bay, as 
hundreds of visiting Aborigines moved through and into the area. The 
Native Police, under the local command of Lt Murray, were alert and 
active.'" There were complaints of cattle-spearing coming in from the 
bunya pine areas, particularly from Widgee Widgee station.''^ 
Murray sent off a detachment to seek out the prepetrators, appointing 
a young and very inexperienced officer in charge, 2nd Lt R.R. 
Morisset, who happened to be the nephew of the force's commandant, 
E.N.V. Morisset. R.R. Morisset's report of what transpired was vague 
in the extreme. Because of "frequent and daring outrages of the blacks 
at the Bunya Bunya", Lt Murray told him to patrol with a detachment. 
Morisset said that he found blacks gathered in "very large numbers" 
in many places. (He was clearly lacking in local knowledge.) They 
were killing cattle at "nearly aU stations", though this was later denied 
by two local stations. He was forced to fire two or three times to 
disperse groups of blacks."' 
John Mortimer was much more precise about events. On Sunday 
10 February, "a little before sunset", Mortimer heard the sound of 
gunshots not far from the Manumbar head station. An Aboriginal 
shepherd ran to the homestead and reported the shooting of blacks 
by Native Police, so John and Alec Mortimer rode out to investigate 
and met a party of troopers accompanied by Mr Giles Jr, of Widgee 
Widgee and another person they assumed to be a police officer and 
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later learned was young Morisset. The other man said they had 
dispersed a group of blacks who had been spearing cattle and whom 
they had pursued from Widgee Widgee. The Mortimers told them 
they had the wrong blacks; those they had "dispersed" had done no 
harm. The police detachment camped overnight at Manumbar. John 
Mortimer testified later that the numbers of Aborigines gathered for 
the bunya season that year were smaller than for many years: about 
200, mainly camped at Yabba. In his personal experience, no sheep 
or cattle had been killed."" 
The next day, several of his black employees told John Mortimer 
that the Native Police had shot many blacks and had since gone to 
Yabba. He foUowed his employees to a waterhole one and a half miles 
(2.5 km) from the homestead and found two Aboriginal corpses with 
buUet wounds. Another body was found at the old camping ground 
and later yet another body was found. Three of the dead were elderly 
men. Meanwhile, Morisset and his men had crossed the range and 
kiUed another Aboriginal on the track to Yabba. When they arrived, 
they arrested two deserters and camped. The local blacks de-camped 
and moved to the Yabber head station for protection. One left a 
blanket behind which was purloined by a trooper; when he went back 
to reclaim it, the trooper threatened to shoot him. The proprietor of 
Yabber station, Mr Swanson, had to go to 2nd Lt Morisset and identify 
the blanket. 
On Tuesday 12 February, Swanson and one of his Aboriginal 
employees accompanied the Native PoUce to stop them shooting any 
peaceable blacks. They were unable to prevent an attack on the blacks' 
camp. Two long-time employees were shot and wounded despite their 
doing as Swanson and Mortimer had told them: they stood their 
ground and caUed out "Bale you shoot. Bale you shoot. Me belonging 
to Mr Mortimer", and "This fellow Mr Swanson's blackfeUow, baal 
shoot him". Another elsewhere was kUled and hidden in a hoUow 
log."' 
Unfortunately, Mortimer and Swanson were not eyewitnesses to the 
actual kUlings, but knew when to take literally what their black 
employees told them. The Mortimer brothers were furious, but knew 
there could be no prosecution because of the inadmissability of 
Aboriginal evidence. Their credibility as protectors and as Christians 
was at stake, and they had a strong sense of justice and an apparently 
genuine feeling for their employees. John Mortimer had been 
incorporated into the Kabi kinship system as a member of the Barang 
section. When he died in 1888, Mortimer was mourned in customary 
fashion by Buyu Marom, whose acquittal of a murder charge he had 
secured years before."* 
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On 22 February, John and Alec Mortimer wrote a statement of the 
events of ten to twelve days earlier in the form of an open letter "To 
the Officer in Command of the Party of Native Police . . .", and sent 
it as a paid advertisement to the Brisbane Courier.*^ The family 
tradition later was that this course of action was necessary because 
the Courier refused to publish it as a letter."* This is unlikely. First, 
there is the slowness of the mails via Nanango,"' and the fact that 
the notice was published only three weeks after writing. Secondly, 
as Cryle points out, the colonial press had a "practice of printing 
ex-parte statements as advertisements".'" 
The letter was extremely sarcastic and contemptuous of Morisset 
and his troopers, using "the hunt" as a metaphor. The Mortimers 
asked whether the elderly victims were shot because they had been 
spearing and stealing stock or simply because they were slower than 
the young men. The two wounded men were long-term employees and 
totaUy innocent. The shooting had been indiscriminate, cruel and weU 
outside the force's commission, and they wanted the force's political 
masters to know about it." 
Accordingly, only three days after the Courier published the letter. 
Premier R.G.W. Herbert wrote to John and Alec Mortimer asking 
for more particulars and evidence of their allegations, and wondering 
why they hadn't simply reported the incident concerned directly to 
the government.'^ On the latter point, the Mortimers' reply on 3 
April was not very clear, but a reasonable deduction is that they did 
not want their complaint to get "lost" in the proper channels." 
Family tradition has it that John Mortimer was "instrumental" 
in having the activities of the Native Police investigated.'" Now, as 
we have seen, the Manumbar incident was but one of four to be 
investigated by the Select Committee, but the timing is sigiufleant. 
At virtually the same time as Premier Herbert would have been reading 
the Mortimers' April letter, the government announced an inquiry. 
It was either the last straw or too public to be concealed. John and 
Alec Mortimer, therefore, deserve considerable credit for forcing an 
inquiry. 
A VERY SELECT COMMITTEE 
On 1 May, the Select Committee was elected by the Legislative 
Assembly. The squatter-dominated house may have been forced into 
an inquiry, but signalled its intentions by the makeup of the 
committee. Cowin noted in her 1950 thesis that the committee was 
so dominated by squatting interests that some potential witnesses 
refused to testify, but no action was taken to penalize them." It was 
even worse than she realized. Including chairman R.R. MacKenzie, 
five of the seven members were squatters, one was a farmer and station 
manager, and the seventh had a son in the Native Police. They were 
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not even representative of squatters generally. Only the chairman was 
a Scot and three were Anglo-Irish. Two of them actually owned 
stations in the Burnett valley.'* Pointedly, the M.P. with possibly the 
greatest concern for the Aborigines, Dr Henry Challinor of Ipswich, 
was not selected. The chairman proved to be very skilled at 
interrogation and at guiding the committee to the desired conclusion. 
MacKenzie needed to be a skilful chairman, as several witnesses 
presented evidence contrary to the committee's opinions. Apart from 
John Mortimer, witnesses included Tom Petrie, Challinor, R.B. 
Sheridan (the Maryborough Customs Officer) and James Davis, as 
"Duramboi", one of the "wild white men". These men gave evidence 
of blatant crimes by Police officers and troopers and named them. 
They refuted some of the more outlandish anti-Aboriginal prejudices 
held by the committee. (For instance, those concerning buggery and 
cannibalism).'^ When Mortimer could not be shaken of the opinion 
that the Aborigines were no more troublesome at bunya time, 
Mackenzie and the committee alluded to the "geographical limitations 
and narrow knowledge of the witnesses".'* MacKenzie was very 
defensive of both squatters and Native Police and regarded the MyaU 
Creek hangings as judicial murder. His questioning of Challinor and 
Mortimer was quite aggressive and pedantic." 
John Mortimer was questioned roughly in the middle of the two 
months' sittings, on Thursday 20 June. He was asked 181 questions, 
mostly by MacKenzie himself. MacKenzie and Mortimer, two hard-
nosed Scots, were a good match for each other. The committee could 
not shake Mortimer's own evidence but cast great doubt on the reports 
of Aborigines which he had accepted as true.*° The committee could 
then take the work of 2nd Lt Morisset and his uncle instead. Three 
of the last five witnesses were Native Police officers. Between 10 and 
12 July, the committee discussed its report which was presented to 
parliament on 17 July. Its most lengthy findings related to minor 
internal reforms of the Native Police. It was critical of the behaviour 
of some officers but not of the system itself and made specific 
recommendations about tightening up recruitment, discipline and 
housekeeping. On the third term of reference, on civiUzing the 
Aborigines, the committee recommended a trial of the Missionary 
Cotton Company scheme as outlined by ex-missionary J.L. Zillman. 
Nothing was to come of this.*' 
The second term of reference concerned the four incidents of 
"unnecessary cruelty". The committee could not "countenance the 
indiscriminate slaughter which appears on more than one occasion 
to have taken place". It then proceeded to exculpate the force per se 
of the murder of Fanny Briggs at Rockhampton, to justify Lt J.O'C. 
Bligh's attack on Maryborough blacks, and merely to reprimand the 
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egregious Lt Frederick Wheeler over his attacks at the Logan and 
Fassifern.*^ On the Manumbar matter, the committee engaged in 
double-talk. Lt Murray was to be sacked largely because he gave 
command of the detachment to the inexperienced R.R. Morisset. The 
committee then accepted without question Morisset's report that the 
Aborigines had "attacked the poUce in the first instance". If they 
found no fault, why was Murray to be removed?*' What is even 
odder is that a few years later, Bligh, Wheeler and Murray were vying 
for the post of Commandant.*" Evidence from Mortimer, and others 
through him, was simply ignored. Not surprisingly, the Brisbane 
Courier did not allow the Native Police issue to die, and opposed the 
findings of the committee.*' In 1863, the Maryborough Chronicle 
criticised the force as "a system of protection by the extermination 
of the blacks", indicating that disenchantment with the force had 
spread to the bush. As Walker argues, some squatters were so disgusted 
with the force that they would put up with Aboriginal depredations 
rather than caU in the Native Police. If they did have the Native Police 
come onto their properties, they accompanied them in order to protect 
their black employes, just as Swanson of Yabber and Mortimer had 
done in February 1861.** 
In effect, the Select Committee managed to admit that the Native 
Police had been dreadful but should continue to be the government's 
main agency in Aboriginal affairs for the next thirty years, and say 
that missionary efforts at civilization should be supported but not 
how. Aboriginal welfare was to be left largely to those relatively few 
graziers and farmers like John Mortimer whom the committee had 
tried to discredit.*' After 1861, the Baiyambora of Yabba were based 
at Manumbar, and were well settled in there until John Mortimer 
retired in 1887. After this, the land was cut up and the Kabi remnants 
were moved on to reserves — Durundur and later to Barambah. 
John Mortimer's intervention in Aboriginal policy can be seen as 
a faUure — at the Select Committee and in the long run. His attitudes 
and actions towards "his" Aborigines between the 1850s and 1880s 
were generally consistent with his humanitarian beliefs and, in the 
context of his time, positive and humane. His respect for the 
Aborigines as persons, though tempered by some of the customary 
disrespect for their culture, was passed on to his nephew, John 
Mathew, whose life work in anthropology was to help white 
Australians understand that culture. In this sense, John Mortimer did 
not strive entirely in vain. 
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APPENDIX 
From Brisbane Courier 16 March 1861 (note errors in signature and date). 
To the Officer in Command of the Party of Native Police, who shot and wounded 
some Blacks on the Station of Manumbar, on Sunday, the 10th instant. 
Sir, — If in future you should take a fancy to bring your troopers upon the Station 
of Manumbar on a sporting excursion we shall feel obUged if you would either bag 
or bury the game which you shoot as it is far from pleasant for us to have the 
decomposing remains of four or five blackfellows laying unburied within a mUe or 
two of our head station. If you will do neither please be kind enough to remove the 
corpses from waterholes near the head station from which we sometimes use water 
for cuUnary purposes. As most of the blacks you left dead on our run were feeble 
old men, some of them apparently not less than eighty years of age, wiU you please 
to inform us whether these hoary sinners are the parties chiefly engaged in spearing 
bullocks and "cramming monkey", &c.; or whether you just shoot them because the 
younger ones are too nimble for you. Besides the four or five you left dead on our 
run, you have wounded two of our station blacks, who have been in our employment 
during lambing, washing, and shearing, and all other busy times for the last eight or 
nine years, and we have never known either of them to have been charged with a crime 
of any kind. One of them came to the station with a bullet wound through one of 
his thighs, another through one of his arms, and another through one of his hands; 
the other had a bullet wound through one of his arms. These blacks, being in our 
employment, very naturally look to us for protection from such outrages, and we are 
of opinion that when you shoot and wound blacks in such an indiscriminate manner, 
you exceed your commission, and we pubUsh this that those who employ and pay you 
may have some knowledge of the way in which you perform your services. 
We have, &c., 
T. & A. MORTIMER 
Manumbar, Feb.22, 1860. 
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